We revisit two classic problems: the assignment problem, in which matched pairs of agents create value, and the bankruptcy problem, in which we need to share an endowment among agents with conflicting claims. Since Core Selection constrains us to exactly divide the value created by matched agents, the assignment problem corresponds to multiple two-player bankruptcy problems. From this we obtain equivalence between the Concede-and-Divide (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) sharing method for the bankruptcy problem and the Fair Division solution (Thompson, 1981) for the assignment problem.
Introduction
The assignment problem, proposed in Shapley and Shubik (1971) , is a transferable-utility version of the matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) . We revisit this classic problem by linking it to a fundamental sharing problem, the bankruptcy problem. While the two problems are well-studied, we provide a clear link between the two. The link allows us to show the concordance of two well-known sharing methods. It also allows for axioms and characterizations for the bankruptcy problem to spill over to the assignment problem.
Assignment problems represent a two-sided matching market, with buyers on one side and sellers on the other. They trade a good in indivisible units. Side payments are allowed and utility is measured in terms of money. Each buyer demands one unit, while sellers each have one unit. Goods are not identical (houses for example) and buyers may have different evaluations of the units up for sale. Sellers may have different reservation prices. The joint profit of matching a buyer with a seller is thus the difference between the evaluation of the buyer and the reserve price of the seller.
A natural way to define a cooperative game from this problem is to suppose that a coalition of buyers and sellers aim to maximize the joint total profits created by these trades. Shapley and Shubik
